Coordination Lock-in

mechanism

Systems lock into bad equilibria when moving to a better alternative is costly unless others move too. The obstacle is not ignorance of the alternative but the risk borne by whoever switches first.

Researchers may know that newer journals are better and still avoid publishing in them. Their careers are judged by hiring committees watching the old journals—while those committees keep watching the old journals because that is where the strongest researchers continue to publish.

The first mover pays for everyone else's hesitation

Two groups are using each other's present behavior as evidence about what they should do next. Researchers need recognised venues to remain competitive; hiring committees need venues that reliably signal strong researchers. Each side therefore makes a locally rational choice that reproduces the shared outcome neither side needs to prefer.

That circular dependence distinguishes coordination lock-in from simple resistance to change. Information alone cannot unlock it: knowing about a superior journal does not remove the career cost of publishing somewhere evaluators discount. This is a multi-sided coordination problem hardened by first-mover risk.

Where it shows up

Academic publishing

Old journals retain their position because researchers follow hiring incentives and hiring committees follow researcher behaviour. Prestige persists through reciprocal expectations, not necessarily through continuing superiority.

Not every stubborn system is coordinated

The model applies when participants would face a real disadvantage by switching alone and that disadvantage depends on others staying put. If researchers can publish elsewhere without losing recognition—or hiring committees can change what they reward without losing access to strong candidates—the circular lock weakens. Mere habit or dislike of novelty requires a different explanation.

Move the evaluator and the evaluated together

When proposing an alternative, do not recruit researchers one by one. Secure an explicit commitment from a hiring institution to recognise the new venue, then use that commitment to recruit an initial cohort of credible researchers. The intervention must reduce the cost of moving early on both sides of the loop.

Episodes that teach this

The World Isn't Broken, Our Coordination Is - Future IQ · explained at 11:32 5,340 views
Researchers can't shift to the new journals because the people hiring are still going to the old journals, and the people hiring can't switch... because the best researchers are publishing in the old journals.